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Abstract Pain, suffering and positive emotions in
patients in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome (VS/UWS) and minimally conscious states
(MCS) pose clinical and ethical challenges. Clinically,
we evaluate behavioural responses after painful stimu-
lation and also emotionally-contingent behaviours (e.g.,
smiling). Using stimuli with emotional valence, neuro-
imaging and electrophysiology technologies can detect
subclinical remnants of preserved capacities for pain
which might influence decisions about treatment
limitation. To date, no data exist as to how healthcare
providers think about end-of-life options (e.g., with-
drawal of artificial nutrition and hydration) in the
presence or absence of pain in non-communicative
patients. Here, we aimed to better clarify this issue
by re-analyzing previously published data on pain
perception (Prog Brain Res 2009 177, 329–38) and
end-of-life decisions (J Neurol 2010 258, 1058–65) in
patients with disorders of consciousness. In a sample
of 2259 European healthcare professionals we found
that, for VS/UWS more respondents agreed with treat-
ment withdrawal when they considered that VS/UWS
patients did not feel pain (77%) as compared to those
who thought VS/UWS did feel pain (59%). This inter-
action was influenced by religiosity and professional
background. For MCS, end-of-life attitudes were not
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influenced by opinions on pain perception. Within a
contemporary ethical context we discuss (1) the evolv-
ing scientific understandings of pain perception and
their relationship to existing clinical and ethical guide-
lines; (2) the discrepancies of attitudes within (and be-
tween) healthcare providers and their consequences for
treatment approaches, and (3) the implicit but complex
relationship between pain perception and attitudes
toward life-sustaining treatments.
Keywords Pain . End-of-life . Vegetative state .
Minimally conscious state . Ethics . Attitudes . Survey
Introduction
Pain and pleasure are inherently subjective experien-
ces that can be verbally communicated to others. In the
absence of oral communication, we can infer these
experiences in others by observing facial expressions
of “liking” or “disliking”. For example, in newborns
the tongue protrusion that can lick the lips can be
considered a positive affective expression whereas
brow wrinkling and wide-eyes opening are usually
considered as facial expressions of negative affect
[e.g., 1]. Likewise, in non-communicative severe brain-
damaged patients we are limited to infer emotional
states by evaluating behavioural responsiveness to ex-
ternal stimuli. Patients in a vegetative state [VS, now
called unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/UWS 2]
are in a condition of preserved wakefulness with absent
volitional behaviour and response to command [3].
Minimally conscious state (MCS) characterizes patients
who show discernible but fluctuating signs of awareness
without effective communication with their environ-
ment [4]. MCS is now subcategorized in MCS- (i.e.,
showing signs of volitional behaviour that is non-reflex
movements like visual pursuit, orientation to pain and
contingent motor responses to specific stimuli) and
MCS+ (i.e., patients showing response to verbal or
written commands) [5]. To date, the management of
pain continues to raise controversial issues both at a
clinical and ethical level [6, 7]. Clinically, the pharma-
cological and non-pharmacological therapy of pain in
non-communicative patients varies from country to
country, mainly depending on the ascription of pain to
these patients [8, 9]. For example, the Multi-Society
Task Force on PVS [10] rules out the possibility that
VS/UWS patients experience pain and hence makes no
recommendations for its management. The Royal Col-
lege of Physicians [11], however, recommends the ad-
ministration of sedatives after treatment withdrawal,
recognizing the possibility of pain and suffering at the
end of life. Suffering (which is considered a property of
sentient organisms) is an ill-defined term, referring to
states of increased distress associated with events threat-
ening the intactness of the person [7, 12]. Suffering in
patients with disorders of consciousness raises contro-
versial questions about whether non-responsive patients
might have such an experience. The issue of suffering
becomes even more challenging when treatment limita-
tion has been agreed upon. End-of-life decisions in
patients with disorders of consciousness are not rare
but the legal provisions currently differ from country
to country [13, 14]. In Europe, there are differences in
the way treatment limitation is perceived, especially
between Northern and Southern countries [15]. We also
showed that opinions on end-of-decisions depend on the
diagnosis of the patient (for VS/UWS there is more
support for treatment withdrawal as compared to
MCS), on the professional status (paramedical workers
agree more with treatment withdrawal as compared to
medical doctors) and on the cultural background of the
clinician making the decision (religious respondents
agree less with treatment limitation as compared to
non-religious).
Here we aim to summarize available evidence on
the study of pain but also of positive emotion and
affect in non-communicative patients. We review the
assessment tools measuring pain at the bedside and
recent functional neuroimaging and electrophysiolog-
ical studies. Some scholars suggest that when pain
perception is suspected in patients with disorders of
consciousness, continuation of life-sustaining treat-
ment may be against patients’ best interests and harm
them by exposing them to unpleasant feelings [16].
Others support that the question should not be about
whether or not to withhold or withdraw life sustaining
treatment patients with disorders of consciousness but
about how much of analgesic care should be adminis-
tered to them [8]. Here, with a further aim to add at
the ethical discussion on end-of-life options with
regards to pain perception in these patients, we re-
analyzed European survey data on healthcare pro-
viders previously published on attitudes on pain per-
ception [6] and end-of life [15] in patients with
disorders of consciousness. We assessed whether opin-
ions on end-of-life options associate with beliefs
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regarding pain perception in patients with disorders of
consciousness and identified variables explaining this
association. Considering the data, we further discuss
(1) the evolving scientific understandings of pain per-
ception and their relationship to existing clinical and
ethical guidelines, (2) the discrepancies in attitudes of
healthcare workers and their consequences for consis-
tent treatment approaches and (3) the implicit but
complex relationship between pain perception and
attitudes toward life-sustaining treatments.
Behavioural Assessment of Negative and Positive
Affect in Non-communicative Patients
According to the International Association for the
Study of Pain (IASP), pain is “an unpleasant sensory
and emotional experience associated with real or po-
tential tissue damage” [17]. This implies that pain has
both physical and emotional properties. We will use
the term ‘nociception’ to refer to the physical respon-
siveness to noxious (harmful) stimulation [18]. Noci-
ception may elicit unconscious postural responses (as
well as other motor reflexes, autonomic and endocri-
nologic responses) without necessarily evoking the
experience of suffering, especially when the brain
has lost its capacity for self-awareness [e.g. spinal
reflexes and lazarus sign in brain death, 10, 19]. As
stressed by the IASP, the inability to communicate
verbally does not negate the possibility that an indi-
vidual is experiencing pain and is in need of appropri-
ate pain-relieving treatment. As pain can also be
present in the absence of noxious stimulation [18],
then how can one know whether patients in VS/
UWS or in MCS experience pain or suffering? At
the bedside, we infer pain perception in these patients
by evaluating behavioural responsiveness to noxious
stimuli. Three types of motor responses are usually
tested: a) stereotypical responses, which are slow ex-
tension or flexion movements of the arms and legs, b)
flexion withdrawal, where the limb moves away from
the point of stimulation and c) localisation responses,
where the non-stimulated limb touches the part of the
body that received the stimulation. Localisation of
pain is the only motor response thought to be a pur-
poseful and intentional act to eliminate a noxious
stimulus [4] but one cannot be sure of how specifically
painful a stimulation can be or how salient it is to the
patient [7]. Hence, pain localization does not necessarily
imply that the patient suffers, but this possibility has to
be considered. Other observed behaviours resulting
from noxious stimulation (i.e., eyes opening, quickening
of breathing, increasing heart rate and blood pressure,
occasional grimace-like or crying-like behaviours) are
considered to be of subcortical origin [also seen in
infants with anencephaly, e.g. 20, 21] and do not neces-
sarily reflect conscious perception of pain. Studies in
general anesthesia also suggest that motor or autonomic
responses are not reliable indicators of consciousness
[e.g. 22]. Clinically, noxious-related behaviours are stud-
ied by applying pressure to the fingernail, to the joints of
the jaw or above the eyes. However, which specific type
of noxious stimulation is the most effective at detecting
signs of conscious perception still remains to be deter-
mined [23]. Numerous scales have been developed for
the assessment of pain in non-communicative subjects,
especially in newborns (e.g., Neonatal Infant Pain Scale;
Faces, Legs, Activity, Cry, Consolability Pain Assess-
ment Tool) and the demented elderly (Pain Assessment
in Advanced Dementia Scale; Checklist of Nonverbal
Pain Indicators). Only recently a validated scale has been
introduced to measure pain in patients with disorders of
consciousness. The Nociception Coma Scale (NCS)
evaluates motor, verbal, facial and visual responses after
noxious stimulation [24]. Its total score ranges between 0
and 12, with 7 indicating perception of pain and hence
need for analgesic treatment.
Using the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R)
[25] for the clinical assessment of consciousness, the
clinician evaluates visual, auditory, motor, oromotor,
communication, and wakefulness levels. The manual
further proposes the additional evaluation of affective
behaviours occurring in the presence of a specific non-
noxious stimulus. Smiling, for example, is among
behaviours that family members and clinical staff
might notice but which can be missed during the
formal administration of the scale. Such responses, in
order to be considered as non-contingent and mean-
ingful, must occur in the presence of a specific stim-
ulus and not occur when the stimulus is absent.
Nevertheless, in clinical practice the behavioural as-
sessment of positive emotions is not yet included in
standardized assessments, possibly because they are
not as alarming compared to responses to threatening
stimuli. Alternative interventions, such as music ther-
apy, could assist in the extraction of positive emotional
responses. For example, it was previously shown that
a patient initially diagnosed as in VS/UWS was
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subsequently categorized in MCS because she showed
consistent emotional behaviours (changes in facial
gestures) to a song of significant personal valence;
such response could not be extracted during classical
evaluation of consciousness [26]. Compensation for false
negatives at the bedside, as a result of patients’ physical
condition (tetraplegia, spasticity, etc.) or low motivation,
is achieved by the assistance of neuroimaging technolo-
gies which begin to shed light on the grey zones of
consciousness in non-communicative patients [27].
Functional Neuroimaging and Electrophysiology
of Negative and Positive Affect in Non-
communicative Patients
At present no functional neuroimaging studies have
truly assessed positive emotions in patients with dis-
orders of consciousness. However, a number of stud-
ies did show that stimuli with emotional valence (as
compared non-neutral stimuli) result in higher-level
brain processing in severely brain damaged patients.
In MCS, infant cries and patient’s own name identified
that, as compared to meaningless noise, there was
more widespread brain activation for the patient’s
own name, followed by infant cries, comparable to
that obtained in controls [28]. Additionally, auditory
stimulation with personalized narratives elicited
similar-to-controls cortical activity associated with
language processing [29]. Residual cognitive process-
ing was also indentified in a MCS patient when he was
told stories by his mother [30] or when intimate family
pictures were presented [31].
In VS/UWS, emotion-related activity of sound or
speech was identified when a patient was told stories
by his mother [32]. In another unresponsive patient,
the mother’s voice elicited a peak EEG frequency at
33 Hz [gamma band, considered to be involved in
conscious perception; e.g., 33] parallel to changes in
heart rate [34]. Heart rate changes in these patients
were also found during the presentation of “positive”
and “negative” music [35]. A long-term comatose
patient with eyes closed and stereotypical motor be-
haviour, showed emotional processing as a response to
her children’s voice followed by her friend’s and by an
unknown voice [36]. In an emotional oddball para-
digm on affective prosody (i.e., a single sad exclama-
tion was presented among four equally probable joyful
exclamations) 6 out of 27 VS/UWS and MCS, and 3
patients with locked-in syndrome (LIS),1 showed a
similar-to-controls broadly distributed electrophysio-
logical negativity (N300) after the sad deviant stimu-
lus, considered indicative of an accurate detection of
affective mismatch [38].
In the absence of subjective response, one cannot
be certain whether such brain responses to emotional
entail conscious awareness. What we are interested in,
however, is to determine the minimal prerequisites of
conscious perception. With regards to pain, previous
neuroimaging studies in healthy volunteers showed
that pain cannot be localized in an isolated “pain
centre” in the brain, but it rather encompasses a neural
circuitry [39, 40]. Two distinct brain networks have
been implicated in pain perception: (i) a lateral pain
system or sensory network processing nociception
(lateral thalamic nuclei, primary and secondary so-
matosensory and posterior parietal cortices); and (ii)
a medial pain system or affective network (medial
thalamus, anterior cingulate, prefrontal and insular
cortices) considered to process the emotional aspects
of pain [41]. When noxious stimulation was applied to
VS/UWS patients, no evidence of noxious stimulation-
related downstream activation beyond primary somato-
sensory cortex was identified [42]. Instead, cortical ac-
tivation subsisted as an island, dissociated from higher-
order associative cortices that are currently thought to be
necessary for conscious awareness [e.g., 43, 44]. How-
ever, another study reported additional activation of
secondary somatosensory and insular cortices in VS/
UWS patients [45], suggesting the possibility of
affective experiences of pain in these patients. As
opposed to VS/UWS patients, noxious stimulation
in MCS patients measured with PET elicited cere-
bral responses not only in the midbrain, thalamus,
and primary somatosensory cortex but also more wide-
spread activation in secondary somatosensory, insular,
posterior parietal, and anterior cingulate cortices,
comparable to healthy controls [46, 47], strongly
1 Patients with locked-in syndrome (LIS) are unable to move
body parts, but remain fully conscious of themselves and their
environment. In classic cases, LIS patients use their eyes for
basic communication with their surroundings (e.g., look up for
“yes”, look down for “no”). In cases of complete LIS, patients
cannot even move their eyelids and, unless carefully assessed,
these patients can be erroneously diagnosed as unconscious
[37].
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suggesting preserved capacity of pain experience
in these patients.
Attitudes Towards Well-Being and Pain-Mediated
End-of-Life Decisions
In healthy controls, pleasure and well-being depends
on the positive affect (hedonia) and on the sense of
purposefulness or engagement in life (eudemonia)
[48]. Despite the general view that quality of well-
being is diminished in disease as a result of limited
capacities to functionally engage in everyday living,
these attitudes are formulated from a third-person per-
spective and may underestimate patients’ subjective
well-being [49]. Indeed, we recently showed that a
majority of patients in a chronic LIS, despite self-
reporting severe restrictions in community reintegra-
tion, professed good subjective well-being [50]. The
self-reported happiness status was associated with lon-
ger duration in LIS, the ability to produce speech and
lower rates of anxiety. In patients with disorders of
consciousness, however, self-ratings are impossible to
acquire and only estimates about what it is like to be in
this situation can be made. An analysis of public
media reports on Terri Schiavo [a patient in a VS/
UWS; e.g., 51], revealed that in some cases the patient
was described as feeling discomfort which was incom-
patible with her state [52]. In another study, ratings
from family members, who are more acquainted with
VS/UWS, showed that 90% of families reported,
among others, that the patients perceived pain [53].
When clinicians were recently asked to express their
opinions on possible pain perception in VS/UWS [6],
a significant number of medical doctors ascribed pain
perception in VS/UWS (56%) despite formal guide-
lines suggesting the opposite [e.g., 10]. Analysis of the
respondents’ characteristics showed that paramedical
professionals, religious respondents, and older health-
care providers reported more often that VS/UWS
patients may experience pain (as opposed to medical
doctors, non-religious and younger respondents). For
MCS, there was no discrepancy in opinions and the
majority (97%) of respondents found that MCS
patients feel pain [6]. Inconsistencies in the medical
management of pain have been shown in a recent
survey in the United States with (conscious) patients
visiting the emergency department with pain-related
complaints; the investigators found that patients aged
older than 75 years were less likely to receive pain
medication as compared to patients aged between 35-
54 years [54]. The issue of pain management in non-
responsive patients becomes more challenging when
withdrawal from life-supporting treatment, such as
artificial nutrition and hydration, has been agreed upon
[15]. In these cases, VS/UWS patients can be left
without administration of opioids or other analgesic
drugs during their dying process [19, 55] on the
grounds that they are deprived from experiencing
suffering due to hunger or thirst [56]. To date, no data
exist as to how opinions on pain perception in patients
with disorders of consciousness could influence views
on end-of-life decisions.
We re-analyzed our previously published survey
data [6, 15] looking for possible correlations between
healthcare providers’ opinions on pain perception in
VS/UWS and MCS and views on end-of-life prefer-
ences in these patients. A sample of 2259 healthcare
professionals coming from 32 European countries (see
Table 1 for demographic data) expressed their opin-
ions (yes-no answers) to the questions: “Do you think
that patients in a vegetative state can feel pain?”; “Do
you think that patients in a minimally conscious state
can feel pain?”; “Do you think that it is acceptable to
stop treatment (i.e., artificial nutrition and hydration-
ANH) in patients in chronic VS?”; “Do you think that
treatment can be stopped in patients in chronic MCS?”
Recorded demographic data included age, gender, na-
tionality, profession, and religious beliefs2 (Table 1).
For chronic VS/UWS, agreement with treatment with-
drawal was negatively correlated with opinions on
pain perception in this state; in other words, the more
respondents found it appropriate to withdraw treat-
ment from VS/UWS patients, the less they recognized
that these patients feel pain (Table 2a; Fig. 1). For
chronic MCS, end-of-life attitudes were not mediated
by opinions on pain perception (Table 2b, Fig. 1). We
then investigated the characteristics of respondents
who supported treatment withdrawal when they
thought that patients in VS/UWS and MCS feel pain
or not. With respect to professional background, for
chronic VS/UWS, more paramedical workers than
2 Religiosity was defined as the belief in a personal God belong-
ing to an institutionalized religion (i.e., Christianity, Islam,
Judaism) independently of practicing.
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medical doctors supported treatment limitation when
they thought that VS/UWS patients feel pain (Fig. 2a,
left panel). For chronic MCS, medical doctors and
paramedical professionals’ opinions did not differ in
terms of pain perception in these patients (Fig. 2b, left
panel). With respect to religious beliefs, for chronic
VS/UWS, less religious than non-religious respond-
ents supported treatment limitation both when they
considered pain perception and not in VS/UWS
patients (Fig. 2a, right panel). For chronic MCS, less
religious than non-religious respondents agreed with
treatment withdrawal when they considered that MCS
patients feel pain (Fig. 2b, right panel).
Ethically Salient Questions
The previously discussed points on clinical assessment,
neuroimaging/electrophysiology applications and
expressed attitudes of laymen and healthcare workers
on pain in VS/UWS and MCS patients generate ethical-
ly salient questions. Some important questions concern:
(1) the evolving scientific understandings of pain per-
ception and their relationship to existing clinical and
ethical guidelines; (2) the discrepancies of attitudes
within (and between) healthcare providers and their
consequences for treatment approaches, and (3) the
implicit but complex relationship between pain percep-
tion and attitudes toward life-sustaining treatments.
Evolving Scientific Understandings of Pain
Perception and their Relationship to Existing
Clinical and Ethical Guidelines
The consistency among respondents’ opinions that
MCS patients are capable for pain perception is sup-
ported by both neuroimaging [e.g., 46] and behaviou-
ral [4] data, showing a distinct clinical picture from
VS/UWS patients. Yet, there is still a minority holding
that VS/UWS feel pain. Interestingly, clinicians have
Table 1 Demographic data of the surveyed clinicians
(n02259)





Respondents by geographical region, no (%)
Northern Europe 316 (14)
Central Europe 1148 (51)
Southern Europe 790 (35)
Missing 5 (0)
Profession, no (%)
Medical professionals 1606 (71)
Paramedical professionals 653 (29)
Religiosity, no (%)
Religious respondents 1286 (57)
Non-religious respondents 915 (40)
Missing 58 (3)
Table 2 Logistic regression (method: enter) results of the
agreement with treatment withdrawal in patients in a vegetative
state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) and min-
imally conscious state (MCS) as predicted by opinions on pain
perception in these states. (a) For VS/UWS, agreement with
treatment withdrawal was significantly predicted when respond-
ents thought less that VS/UWS patients feel pain. (b) For MCS,
agreement with treatment withdrawal was not significantly pre-
dicted by opinions on pain perception in these patients
Odds ratioa 95.0% Confidence interval p value
Lower Upper
a. Treatment can be stopped in VS/UWS
Patients in VS/UWS can feel pain 0.420 0.348 0.507 <.001
Constant 3.414 <.001
b. Treatment can be stopped in MCS
Patients in MCS can feel pain 0.658 0.414 1.046 0.077
Constant 0.612 0.034
Predicted response: ‘agreement’
a An odds ratio higher than 1 signifies more agreement with the statement, whereas an odds ratio less than 1 notifies less agreement
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consistently offered ambiguous or mixed answers
about pain perception in VS/UWS (or MCS) patients
[57]. For example, Payne et al. [57] surveyed 170
physicians from the American Academy of Neurology
and 150 from the American Medical Directors Asso-
ciation and reported that 30% believed VS/UWS
patients experience pain (interestingly, they found no
differences between academic and non-academic
physicians). Similarly, an unpublished survey by the
American Neurological Association reported that 31%
of its members were “uncertain” about whether VS/
UWS patients could experience pain (31%) and suf-
fering (26%) [58].
Two possible non-mutually exclusive interpretations
of this tension or gap between guidelines and clinicians
merit our attention. On the one hand, perhaps clinicians
are blatantly wrong, or are what we could call in dis-
agreement of knowledge with guidelines, i.e., they are or
were wrong because they did not know. In support of this
interpretation, research on diagnostic accuracy has shown
that clinicians have trouble distinguishing the VS/UWS
from MCS [59–61] and even confuse the VS/UWS with
more remote states, like brain death and the locked in
syndrome [62–64]. Knowledge disagreement could also
be explained by the fact that, prior to the 2002 guidelines
on MCS [4], MCS patients could have been clustered
with VS/UWS patients within the broader category of
vegetative patients. On the other hand, perhaps a different
kind of disagreement could also be at work, a disagree-
ment of apprehension or perspective, entailing that clini-
cians are or were observing pain perception in some
Fig. 1 Attitudes towards treatment withdrawal in VS/UWS are
mediated by opinions on pain perception in patients in vegeta-
tive state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) but
not in minimally conscious state (MCS)
Fig. 2 Attitudes towards treatment withdrawal in patients in
vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS;
panel a) and minimally conscious state (MCS; panel b) with
regards to pain perception as formulated by professional back-
ground and religious beliefs
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patients which was not reflected fully in guidelines of-
fered to them. Following this interpretation, clinicians
who may have or have not been in agreement of knowl-
edge with guidelines may have nonetheless been at odds
with them, deliberately or not, because of a difference in
apprehension of pain perception. For example, influential
guidelines such as the Multi-society Task Force’s guide-
lines on the VS [10] could have under-recognized pain
in MCS patients, not well distinguished from VS patients
at the time of their publication. Accordingly, perhaps
clinicians might have been partly right not to offer
answers consistent with the views of major professional
societies.
Now that we realize with hindsight that MCS is
acknowledged as a distinct diagnostic category and
that these patients feel pain, we are invited to greater
humility in discussing pain perception (and awareness
more generally) in disorders of consciousness. The
different interpretations of the disagreement between
clinicians and guidelines open up room for a caution-
ary medico-ethical approach where the perspective of
a broad base of clinicians may need to be considered
carefully in the development of guidelines as an addi-
tional process to establish external validity of diagnos-
tic categories. There is no doubt that some confusion
about VS/UWS and MCS exists due to lack of knowl-
edge in healthcare professionals, including specialized
clinicians [63]. However, to date, discrepancies have
often been considered to be a knowledge gap on the
part of clinicians; not a possible misapprehension of
the guidelines themselves in spite of unspecific or
indirect evidence about capacities like pain perception.
In these patients, closer attention to why clinicians
disagree with common understandings (e.g., through
methodologies that allow to capture these information)
could be an important ingredient in the development
of consensual approaches and guidelines to tease apart
disagreements of knowledge and disagreements of
apprehension.
Discrepancies in Attitudes of Healthcare Providers
and Their Consequences for Consistent Treatment
Approaches
Our analysis suggests discrepancies between or within
healthcare providers, which merit close attention. For
example, respondents’ opinions for chronic VS/UWS
patients were mediated by professional background
(Fig. 2). More paramedical respondents (64%) as com-
pared to medical doctors (56%) were in favor of treat-
ment withdrawal when also thinking that these
patients perceive pain. The observed differences based
on professional background might be related to many
factors including differences in proximity to the patient,
time spent at the bedside, sensibilities, and education
[65, 66]. Nonetheless, this variability is concerning.
Family members may be exposed to various messages
about pain perception based on who they talk to [67].
Opinions on pain perception and end-of-life in MCS
seemed to be less controversial among respondents,
with no differences between physicians and paramedical
professionals. In other research, we have found
similarly that physician characteristics can shape
attitudes toward end-of-life care, judgments about
quality of life, and prognosis for post-coma recovery
[67]. Several studies have shown differences between
medical specialists and various healthcare providers in
end-of-life care [65, 68–71].
Religiosity in general (i.e., when both religious and
non-religious respondents were taken together) did not
mediate the support on treatment withdrawal when
comparing opinions about pain perception in VS/
UWS patients (Fig. 2). However, some differences
were identified between religious and non-religious
respondents about withdrawal of life support. Al-
though treatment withdrawal was generally supported
less for MCS than for VS/UWS, religious respondents
disagreed with treatment withdrawal significantly
more than non-religious respondents (Fig. 2). We have
previously shown that religious beliefs influence per-
sonal philosophical convictions towards dualistic
views on the relationship between consciousness and
the brain [72]. Such personal beliefs have also been
shown to weigh on physicians’ clinical decisions [e.g.,
73]. In line with our findings on the influence of
religion and age on beliefs about pain perception in
VS/UWS [6], other studies on, for example, end-of-
life decisions in intensive care patients have shown
that older and more experienced doctors and doctors
with religious convictions (i.e., Christians) more often
refused to opt for treatment limitations [74, 75].
The impact of physician- (or other clinicians) de-
pendent variability is not well understood although its
existence is now well established. Future research
could pay closer attention to this phenomenon in the
context of disorders of consciousness a) to better un-
derstand the existence of variability between members
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of healthcare teams; b) to better characterise the im-
pact of variability on family members and proxy de-
cision makers; and c) to develop, if applicable,
approaches to mitigate variability or its consequences
through, for example, consensual chart notes and team
discussion and communication [76].
The Implicit but Complex Relationship
Between Pain Perception and Attitudes Toward
Life-Sustaining Treatments
The data we reviewed above suggest a connection
between beliefs about perception of pain and attitudes
toward end-of-life decision-making in VS/UWS. Gen-
erally, the more a patient is able to feel pain, the less
favorable a clinician is to withdrawal of life support.
For instance, treatment withdrawal for chronic VS/
UWS was supported more when respondents consid-
ered that these patients do not feel pain (77%) as
compared to when they thought the patients feel pain
(59%; Fig. 1). The high number of participants sup-
porting treatment withdrawal in VS/UWS when con-
sidering that pain perception is absent is in line with
existing guidelines on pain perception in these
patients. However, the overall data suggest conflicting
or complex ethical reasoning made by respondents
regarding the relationship between pain perception
and acceptability of withdrawal of life support.
At first glance, the relationship observed could be
justified in as much as a patient with more sentience, and
therefore more awareness, could be judged to be apt to
be kept alive. Likewise, a patient who does not feel pain
could be exhibiting lack of awareness and be allowed to
die. We previously discussed that end-of-life opinions
referring to patients (as opposed to imagined scenarios
of oneself being in a state of disordered consciousness),
could be formulated based on evidence of awareness
[15]. With a similar rationale, pain as a subjective con-
scious experience corresponds to a form of conscious
awareness. And such evidence, according to some, may
give a strong reason to preserve life [77]. For the sake of
our discussion we can retain this hypothesis as one
possible explanation of the relationship observed in the
data and also an approach put forth by some commen-
tators [78] (and criticized by others [79]). We do admit
that this is an implicit connection but given its plausibility
and consequences, we discuss some of its assumptions
further.
The implicit connection between greater pain sen-
tience, greater awareness and therefore for greater
reticence to withdrawal of life support resonates with
a heavy trend in bioethics exploring the principle of
respect for persons in terms of personhood or moral
status of the person. This trend or line of argument
usually assumes that we respect persons or other moral
agents because of their ability or capacity as moral
agents or persons. The capacities of persons usually
refer to things like sentience and interests [80] or
cognitive abilities [81] according to different authors.
An enormous literature has examined and discussed if
and what conditions or criteria a person or a moral
agent must fulfill [e.g., 82], hoping thereby to shed
lights on debates related to the beginning or the end of
life [83]. In this scheme, evidence of sentience could
very well be understood as a proof of being a moral
agent. As suggested by Ropper, recent neuroimaging
research, if it shows residual cognitive function or pain
perception, could easily be interpreted by family mem-
bers as an indication that treatments should be main-
tained [78]. Underlying this view is the assumption
that some ontological status can be correlated to being
a person and, once this state established, respect for
that person or moral agent is called for. For the sake of
clarity and simplicity, this could be designated as the
ontological understanding of respect for persons in
this paper.
Generally, equating persons with their brains or
neurological status has been described in other areas
of neuroethics as neuro-essentialism [84] and carries
wide-ranging philosophical and practical problems
[85]. A closer examination of the ontological under-
standing of respect for persons reveals specific prob-
lems of two different natures. First, at a more practical
level, greater sentience or pain perception in MCS
could mean greater ability to feel pleasurable states
or well-being, which would call for specific therapeu-
tic approaches [79] and an argument in favour of
maintaining treatments. But greater sentience could
very well mean a greater ability to feel both pain and
suffering, i.e., the effects of being in a severely com-
promised state. In this sense, pain perception does not
relate directly or clearly to a specific stance in favour
of (or against) maintaining life support. Second, and
more fundamentally, respect for persons entails other
aspects which are not captured in a canonical (and
allegedly simplified for this paper) ontological under-
standing of respect for persons. On the one hand, the
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preferences and interests of the person to be main-
tained in a state of pain sentience could still be argued
to depend largely on preferences and interests as de-
fined by the patient herself previously (or as voiced or
articulated by a proxy decision-maker). In this sense,
the close attention to what the patient would have
wanted is crucial and the establishment of pain sen-
tience is not by any standards a surrogate for this. On
the other hand, still, the ontological view also causes
problems because it does not capture stricto sensu
non-ontological aspects of the principle of respect for
persons. Respect for persons does partly rely on the
fact that entities respected are considered to have a
moral status or moral agency but also, at the same
time, because they have worth and value for (and in
relationship to) others. Consider the scenario, of a
loved one (e.g., child, parent, spouse) being in a neu-
rologically severely compromised state, and even in a
state of disordered consciousness. To treat such a
compromised loved one without respect would stir in
most if not all strong feelings of disapproval even if
one agrees that cognitive capacities have diminished or
maybe vanished. This urge for respecting the person is
not based on the person’s capacities; on the contrary she
may have lost them. It is rather a mixture of obligations
towards others, respect for human relationship or respect
for what a person was before the injury that support this
principle. This is a more relational (or contextual) un-
derstanding of respect for persons and such an under-
standing is ill-captured by common arguments, which
equate the person to a neurological status as found at the
basis of the ontological view.
Consequently, the implicit connection between
sentience and attitudes favoring life should be
examined critically (if it does exist in clinicians
as we have supposed for our discussion to better
examine it critically). This link is debatable be-
cause it may rely on a dubious understanding of
respect for persons which does not capture the
preferences or wishes of the patient as defined
by herself, overly objectifies persons and ontolo-
gizes the principle of respect for persons. The
ontological view may carry forth a broader reduc-
tionist framework which, by strongly linking per-
sonhood to some ontological status, does not
grasp the relational aspects captured in the princi-
ple of respect for persons. By extension, implicit
or explicit uses of the ontological understanding
in interpretations of recent neuroimaging research
should be carefully identified and considered to
ensure clarity about the reasons underlying respect
for persons. This is reinforced by different studies
showing strong appeal of neuroimaging data in
the public eye [86–89], which could easily lead
to neuroessentialism.
Conclusions
The quantification of pain and suffering as well of
possible pleasure and happiness in VS/UWS and
MCS patients remains extremely challenging. Func-
tional neuroimanging and electrophysiology studies
are offering new ways to better understand the residual
cerebral processing of emotional stimuli in patients
with disorders of consciousness. We here showed that
healthcare providers’ beliefs on possible pain percep-
tion in these patients influence opinions on end-of-life.
More respondents who considered these patients to
feel pain also opposed to withdrawing life sustain
therapy. This interaction was stronger in religious
caregivers and nurses. Recent neuroimaging findings
as well as research on attitudes of healthcare providers
bring forth important questions about the relationship
of this research to clinical guidelines, the discrepan-
cies of attitudes between healthcare providers and the
complex relationship between pain perception and
attitudes toward life-sustaining treatments. These
ethical questions illustrate the need for closer atten-
tion to perspectives in research and in clinical care
within the development of consensual approaches
and guidelines; the need to understand practice
variability and to minimize its impact on families;
and the careful interpretation of recent neuroimaging
findings and their consequences on withdrawal of life
support.
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